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COMMENTS ON PANEL 1 
CHRISTINE FARLEY  
 I am extremely grateful to both of these speakers for sharing these papers 
with us.  The papers themselves are beautifully written.  I had immense joy 
in reading them, and I am very happy they are part of this conference.  I 
want to congratulate both of you for doing such big projects in a short 
amount of space and synthesizing so much work, and interdisciplinary 
work at that.  I am going to attempt to say a few things that might put the 
papers “in dialogue.” 
In a sense, both papers talk about dualisms.  Most obviously, Dan’s 
paper examines the mind/body dualism.  Carys’s paper also involved a 
dualism: the origination/imitation dualism, if you will.  Each paper reminds 
us that these dualisms, or paradigms, do not map onto reality very well.  
Instead, these paradigms mask reality and produce some negative effects.  
One effect is an inaccurate distribution of rights.  Perhaps we saw that most 
clearly in Dan’s paper.  These dualisms cause us to devalue feminized 
traits.  In the IP context that means that they cause us to incorrectly value 
the labor and the production of creating works, as well as the works, 
inventions, and discoveries themselves.  In fact, these dualisms may not 
even have the desired effect of incentivizing behaviors that we would like 
to incentivize through the intellectual property system (i.e., the progress of 
the arts and sciences).  These insights are important contributions to a 
feminist study of intellectual property. 
Nevertheless, I wonder about the project of deconstructing these 
paradigms and where that leads us.  If we deconstruct the mind/body 
dualism and the authorship construct, what would be the result?  What 
would happen if the law recognized what Dan terms “invisible work”?  
What would be the practical effect of rendering this work legally visible?  
Wouldn’t we have more patents issued?  Would this be a good thing for 
competition?  Carys acknowledged this a little bit in her paper when she 
said, “this deconstruction might lead to the demise of the copyright 
system,” which she thought may not be a good thing.  But both of these 
papers recognized that these paradigms offer us a convenient ruse.  They 
offer the intellectual property system a ruse for the location and assignment 
of rights and for the requirements of the creation of rights.  And they also 
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remind us that these paradigms have really taken hold.  They seem to have 
intuitive appeal, and they seem to outlast any critique. 
These papers caused me to recall a recent visit to the Museum of the 
American Indian where I saw a performance of tribal song and dance.  
Through the introductions to these performances, we were informed that 
the songs and dances were very traditional and that they were being 
performed according to the traditional rules.  But at the end, each song was 
credited in a way that was surprising to me.  Some young person would be 
pointed out as the “owner” of the song.  I wondered how these songs could 
both be so traditional and authentic and also have their ownership assigned 
to an individual, and a young one at that.  I wonder now, given what we 
have heard from these papers today, whether that “owner” may have 
discovered the songs.  Or perhaps the owner was in dialogue with them.  Or 
maybe the owner made the songs concrete if they had previously been in 
the mind only.  In other words, this ownership system may represent an 
alternative imagined in these papers.  Perhaps it offers the kind of practical 
assignment of rights without maintaining the traditional ownership 
paradigm. 
The speakers demonstrate for us that feminist theory can make important 
contributions to the field of intellectual property and have thus earned their 
airfare here in doing that today.  Feminist theory allows us to acknowledge 
this ruse for what it is, and thereby allows us to expose its detrimental 
effects and to offer alternative solutions.  Dichotomies are attractive 
because of the simplistic truths they seem to offer.  But in their simplicity 
they do not always work so well.  These dualisms and constructs are 
therefore not constant in the development of IP law.  We see, and there are 
examples of this in both of the papers, where these dualisms and constructs 
have ebbs and flows.  They come on very strongly at some points and they 
conveniently recede at others.  It is at these moments where these 
paradigms emerge and disappear that they are really doing their work.  And 
it is at these points that we have an opportunity to offer alternatives that we 
can take from feminist theory. 
I want to thank these speakers for the hope that they have given us for 
this project in intellectual property.  It has been a great start for this 
conference because they have given us a real foundation for this feminist 
project. I want to again acknowledge the great contribution from these 
speakers. Thank you. 
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